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Abstract 
We explore in this paper the implications of ethical and operational principles for the evaluation of 
population health. We formalize those principles as axioms for social preferences over distributions of 
health for a given population. We single out several focal population health evaluation functions, which 
represent social preferences, as a result of combinations of those axioms. Our results provide rationale 
for popular theories in health economics (such as the unweighted aggregation of QALYs or HYEs, and 
generalizations of the two, aimed to capture concerns for distributive justice) without resorting to 
controversial assumptions over individual preferences. 
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1 Introduction
The goal of all health services activities and programs is to improve the
health of people. Such a goal places a central role to the definition and mea-
surement of benefit in health care, as well as how it should be distributed
in a population. It is not surprising that, over the years, there has been
considerable interest and activity in developing methods to measure quan-
titatively the health status of individuals and populations (e.g., Torrance,
1986). Economists, practitioners and social scientists alike have long been
concerned with this issue. Attempts to develop appealing measures to eval-
uate the health of a population abound in the literature (e.g., Plinskin et al.,
1980; Torrance, 1986; Mehrez and Gafni, 1989; Wagstaff, 1991; Bleichrodt,
1995, 1997; Williams, 1997; Dolan, 1998, 2000; Murray et al., 2002; Ble-
ichrodt et al., 2004; Guerrero and Herrero, 2005; Østerdal, 2005; Fleurbaey
and Schokkaert, 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to take the axiomatic approach to the
evaluation of population health, a somewhat unexplored approach in the
health economics literature, in contrast to many other fields in economics.
An axiomatic study begins with the specification of a domain of problems,
and the formulation of a list of desirable properties (axioms) of solutions
for the domain, whereas it ends with (as complete as possible) descriptions
of the families of solutions satisfying various combinations of the properties
(e.g., Thomson, 2001). An axiomatic study often results in characterization
theorems. They are theorems identifying a particular solution, or perhaps
a family of solutions, as the only solution or family of solutions, satisfying
a given list of axioms. This is precisely what we aim to do in this paper.
In other words, we aim to list some appealing axioms for the evaluation of
population health and then derive precise measures to evaluate the health
of a population.
It has been frequently argued that the benefit that a patient derives
from a particular health care intervention is defined according to two di-
mensions: quality of life and quantity of life. We endorse such assumption
in our model. More precisely, we assume that the distribution of health in
a population is defined by a collection of duplets, each indicating the sta-
tus that an agent of the population achieves in the two dimensions: health
(quality of life) and time (quantity of life). We shall refer to those dis-
tributions as population health distributions. We, however, departure from
This text presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of
Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister’s Office, Science Policy Pro-
gramming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors.
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earlier contributions within the health economics literature, to deal with
the evaluation of health distributions, which presume an implicit relation-
ship between the two dimensions at the individual level (e.g., Bleichrodt,
1995, 1997; Østerdal, 2005; Bleichrodt et al., 2004; Doctor et al., 2009). In
other words, we do not assume from the outset the existence of an index
summarizing the information of each duplet. Nevertheless, as we shall see
later, we implicitly derive indices of that sort as a result of combining our
axioms.
Our ultimate goal in this paper will be to single out, as a result of com-
bining several axioms reflecting ethical and operational principles, specific
measures to evaluate population health distributions. The key tool of our
work to achieve that goal will be what we call a population health evalua-
tion function (“PHEF” hereafter). A PHEF is a mapping that associates
with each population health distribution a real number intended to per-
form comparisons among them and, hence, reflect social preferences over
those distributions. We shall single out several PHEFs, each reflecting well-
known natural views in the economic appraisal of health care programmes
for resource allocation decisions. The axiomatic characterizations leading to
these PHEFs will allow us to scrutinize their relative virtues by means of
comparing the principles (axioms) that drive each of them.
One of the PHEFs we shall single out is the so-called linear QALY func-
tion, which evaluates population health by means of the unweighted aggre-
gation of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). In contrast to the literature
dealing with this focal and common procedure to aggregate health benefits
in economic evaluations of health care, we derive it without imposing any
structure on individual preferences over health. As a result, we avoid one of
the main criticisms of the QALY measure, namely that it relies on restrictive
assumptions over individual preferences (e.g., Loomes and McKenzie, 1989).
We shall also single out the so-called linear HYE function, which evaluates
population health by means of the unweighted aggregation of healthy years
equivalents (HYEs). In doing so, we shall be able to scrutinize further the
similarities and differences between these two focal concepts (HYEs and
QALYs) in health economics, an aspect that has received considerable at-
tention in the literature (e.g., Mehrez and Gafni, 1989; Culyer and Wagstaff,
1993; Gafni et al., 1993; Bleichrodt, 1995).
Both PHEFs (linear QALY and linear HYE) dismiss a concern for dis-
tributive justice in the evaluation process of population health distributions.
They simply focus on the aggregate number (of QALYs or HYEs) that a dis-
tribution delivers. We also characterize in this paper PHEFs modifying the
previous two in order to capture concerns for distributive justice. As we shall
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see later, the resulting PHEFs, which are also inspired by classical contri-
butions in the economics literature, are closely connected to other proposals
in the literature on health economics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the model and the basic axioms we consider. In Section 3, we introduce
and characterize two focal PHEFs. We generalize them, and characterize
the ensuing PHEFs, in Section 4. We discuss the results and some possible
extensions in Section 5. For a smooth passage, we defer the proofs and
provide them in an appendix.
2 The preliminaries
We consider a policy maker who has to make a choice between distributions
of health for a population of fixed size n ≥ 3. We identify the population
(society) with the set N = {1, ..., n}. The health of each individual in the
population will be described by a duplet indicating the level achieved in two
parameters: quality of life and quantity of life. Assume that there exists
a set of possible health states, A, defined generally enough to encompass
all possible health states for everybody in the population. We emphasize
that A is an abstract set without any particular mathematical structure.1
Quantity of life will simply be described by a set of nonnegative real numbers,
T ⊂ R. In what follows, and unless otherwise stated, we assume that T =
[0,+∞). Formally, let hi = (ai, ti) ∈ A × T denote the health duplet of
individual i.2 A population health distribution (or, simply, a health profile)
h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), ..., (an, tn)] specifies the health duplet of each
individual in society. We denote the set of all possible health profiles by
H, i.e., H is the n-Cartesian product of the set A × T . Even though we
do not impose a specific mathematical structure on the set A, we assume
that it contains a specific element, a∗, which we refer to as perfect health
and which is univocally identified, as a “superior” state, by all agents in the
population.
The policy maker’s preferences (or social preferences) over health profiles
are expressed by a preference relation %, to be read as “at least as preferred
as”. As usual,  denotes strict preference and ∼ denotes indifference. We
assume that the relation % is a weak order, i.e., it is complete (for each
1A could for instance refer to the resulting multidimensional health states after com-
bining the levels of each dimension of a categorical measure, such as EQ-5D, in all possible
ways.
2For ease of exposition, we establish the notational convention that hS ≡ (hi)i∈S , for
each S ⊂ N .
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health profiles h, h′, either h % h′, or h′ % h, or both) and transitive (if
h % h′ and h′ % h′′ then h % h′′).
A population health evaluation function (PHEF) is a real-valued function
P : H → R. We say that P represents % if
P (h) ≥ P (h′)⇔ h % h′,
for each h, h′ ∈ H. Note that if P represents % then any (continuous)
strictly increasing transformation of P would also do so.
The model we just outlined has several possible interpretations:
For instance, the pair (ai, ti) could be identifying an agent having a
chronic (or “average”) health state ai throughout a (remaining) lifetime of
length ti. In this sense, the model could be used to express a social planner’s
preference over societies (of the same size) with different distributions of the
citizens health states and (remaining) life years. Alternatively, we could
interpret ai as a vector itself ai = (a
1
i , . . . , a
ti
i ) indicating the health state of
agent i at each period of her remaining lifetime ti.
3
We may also think of the scenario in which the planner launches an inter-
vention and this intervention results in a health state ai for a period of time
ti for each agent i in the society, relative to some status-quo distribution.
Different interventions can then be compared on the basis of their resulting
distributions of health states and time periods.4
Finally, we could assume that ai reflects both the quantity and quality
of i’s health state, whereas ti reflects the income of agent i. In doing so,
the social planner’s preference would not just be defined over health dis-
tributions, but rather over a proxy of welfare distributions, provided one
interprets welfare as a combination of health and income.5
2.1 Basic structural axioms
We now list the axioms for social preferences that we consider in this pa-
per. As we shall see, each of them will reflect an ethical or an operational
principle.
3Note that no assumption from the model precludes us from interpreting A as a mul-
tidimensional space.
4In these first two interpretations, some of the axioms we shall consider later would be
less controversial if the population is assumed to reflect a cohort of agents with the same
age.
5This interpretation is reminiscent of the approach taken by Fleurbaey and Shokkaert
(2009).
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Our first axiom, anonymity, is a standard formalization of the principle
of impartiality, which refers to the fact that ethically irrelevant information
is excluded from the evaluation process. In other words, the identity of
agents should not matter and the evaluation of the population health should
depend only on the list of quality-quantity duplets, not on who holds them.
Formally, let ΠN denote the class of bijections from N into itself. Then,
ANON: h ∼ hpi for each h ∈ H, and each pi ∈ ΠN .
The next axiom, separability, underlies the use of incremental analysis
in cost-effectiveness analysis, which implies that individuals for whom two
treatments yield the same health should not influence the relative evaluation
of these treatments (e.g., Gold et al., 1996; Turpcu et al., 2011). More
precisely, it says that if the distribution of health in a population changes
only for a subgroup of agents in the population, the relative evaluation of
the two distributions should only depend on that subgroup.6 Formally,
SEP:
[
hS , hN\S
]
%
[
h′S , hN\S
] ⇔ [hS , h′N\S] % [h′S , h′N\S], for each S ⊆
N , and h, h′ ∈ H.
Continuity is the adaptation to our context of a usual axiom. It says
that for fixed distributions of health states, the population health ordering
is smooth in lifetimes. In spite of being an apparently technical condition,
it is also an ethically attractive axiom. It models non-arbitrariness of the
social preferences.
CONT: Let h, h′ ∈ H, and h(k) be a sequence in H such that, for each
i ∈ N , h(k)i = (ai, t(k)i )→ (ai, ti) = hi. If h(k) % h′ for each k, then h % h′.
The next axiom, perfect health superiority, refers to the superiority of the
state of perfect health. More precisely, it says that replacing the health sta-
tus of an agent by that of perfect health, ceteris paribus, cannot worsen the
evaluation of the population health. It constitutes the closest approximation
in our context to the Pareto principle of optimality, and it also reflects a
certain notion of solidarity, a principle with a long tradition of use in the
theory of justice (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006).
PHS: For each h = [h1, . . . , hn] ∈ H and i ∈ N , let h∗i = (a∗, ti). Then,
[h∗i , hN\{i}] % h.
6The notion of separability has a long tradition of use in models of cooperative decision
making (e.g., Moulin, 1988).
5
A somewhat related axiom comes next. Time monotonicity at perfect
health says that if each agent is at perfect health, increasing the time di-
mension is strictly better for society. Formally,
TMPH: If, for each i ∈ N , ti ≥ t′i, at least one strict, then [(a∗, t1), . . . , (a∗, tn)] 
[(a∗, t′1), . . . , (a∗, t′n)].
The previous two axioms convey some sort of desirability of the perfect
health state. The next axiom, however, puts a cap on it. More precisely,
non-desirable death states that society (strictly) improves by replacing an
agent with perfect health and zero lifetime, with any other agent having a
positive lifetime (independently of her health state). Formally,
NDD: For each h ∈ H and i ∈ N such that ti > 0, h  [hN\{i}, (a∗, 0)].
The next axiom, social zero condition, also refers to the case of zero
lifetime and is reminiscent of a widely used condition for individual utility
functions on health (e.g., Bleichrodt et al., 1997; Miyamoto et al., 1998;
Østerdal 2005). It says that if an agent gets zero lifetime, then her health
state does not influence the social desirability of the health distribution.
Formally,
ZERO: For each h ∈ H and i ∈ N such that ti = 0, and a′i ∈ A, h ∼
[hN\{i}, (a′i, 0)].
3 The axiomatic characterizations of two focal PHEFs:
QALYs and HYEs
The most widely employed way of combining the quality of life and quan-
tity of life derived from a particular health care intervention is by means
of QALYs. The following PHEF, which we call linear QALY, evaluates
population health distributions by means of the unweighted aggregation of
individual QALYs in society, or, in other words, by the weighted (through
health levels) aggregate time span the distribution yields. Formally,
P q[h1, . . . , hn] = P
q[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
q(ai)ti, (1)
where q : A→ [0, 1] is an arbitrary function satisfying 0 ≤ q(ai) ≤ q(a∗) = 1,
for each ai ∈ A.
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Our first result says that P q is characterized by the combination of the
basic structural axioms described above plus the following specific axiom,
time invariance at common health, which refers to the equal value of life
gains for persons with common health states.7 Formally,
TICH: For each h ∈ H, c > 0, and i, j ∈ N , such that ai = aj ,[
(ai, ti + c), (aj , tj), hN\{i,j}
] ∼ [(ai, ti), (aj , tj + c), hN\{i,j}] .
Our characterization result comes next.
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (1).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and
TICH.
An alternative way of combining the quality of life and quantity of life de-
rived from a particular health care intervention is by means of healthy years
equivalents (HYEs). The next PHEF, which we call linear HYE, evaluates
population health distributions by means of the aggregation of individuals’
HYEs. Formally,
P h[h1, . . . , hn] = P
h[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
f(ai, ti), (2)
where f : A × T → T is a function indicating the HYEs for each possible
individual, i.e., for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ].
Our second result characterizes the linear HYE PHEF by adding to the
basic structural axioms a weakening of TICH. More precisely, time invari-
ance at perfect health is the weakening of the above axiom to the case in
which the common health state is precisely the perfect health state. For-
mally,
TIPH: For each h ∈ H, c > 0, and i, j ∈ N , such that ai = aj = a∗,[
(ai, ti + c), (aj , tj), hN\{i,j}
] ∼ [(ai, ti), (aj , tj + c), hN\{i,j}] .
The characterization result of the HYE PHEF comes next.
7Thus, the axiom conveys an absence of lifetime discrimination: an individual is not
less worthy of treatment on the sole grounds that she has a longer lifetime. As a matter of
fact, the axiom is very similar, although not identical, to the so-called non-age dependence
axiom in Østerdal (2005).
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Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (2).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and
TIPH.
As we can observe from the statements of the two theorems, weakening
TICH, so that the axiom is restricted to the case in which the common
health state is the perfect health state, allows us to move from the (linear)
QALY PHEF to the much broader family of (linear) HYE PHEFs.
4 More general PHEFs
Both (linear) PHEFs highlighted in the previous section amount unweighted
aggregation across individuals, an aspect usually criticized in the health eco-
nomics literature by its lack of concern for distributive justice (e.g., Loomes
and McKenzie, 1989; Wagstaff, 1991; Dolan, 1998). We present (and char-
acterize) in this section more general PHEFs, which aim to generalize the
above two, in order to capture such a concern.
4.1 Power QALYs and HYEs
We start with two PHEFs that simply introduce suitable powers in the
QALYs (or HYEs) each agent in the population gets. The rationale behind
this idea can be traced back to Bergson (e.g., Burk, 1936). In a health eco-
nomics context, power functions of QALYs were introduced, at an individual
level, by Pliskin et al., (1980). The so-called Bergsonian approach has also
been discussed in the health economics literature by Wagstaff (1991) and
Williams (1997), among others.
Formally, the power QALY PHEF is defined as:
P pq[h1, . . . , hn] = P
pq[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
q(ai)t
γ
i , (3)
where q : A→ [0, 1] is an arbitrary function satisfying 0 ≤ q(ai) ≤ q(a∗) = 1,
for each ai ∈ A, and γ ∈ R++ is a positive scalar.
Likewise, the power HYE PHEF is defined as:
P ph[h1, . . . , hn] = P
ph[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
f(ai, ti)
γ , (4)
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where γ ∈ R++ is a positive scalar, and f : A×T → T is a function indicating
the HYEs for each possible individual, i.e., for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] =
[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ].
As we show next, the above two PHEFs are characterized by combining
the following pair of axioms with the basic structural axioms we introduced
in Section 2.
The axiom of time scale independence says that evaluations should not
depend on the variable we use to measure quantity of life (e.g., days, months,
years). More precisely, it says that the ranking of a pair of population
health distributions does not reverse when all lifetimes are multiplied by a
common positive constant.8 The individual level counterpart to this axiom
is often referred to in the literature as the constant proportional trade-off
assumption (e.g., Pliskin et al., 1980). Previous experimental studies have
provided mixed support for such assumption (e.g., Attema and Brouwer,
2010), with mostly person and context-specific violations. Thus, we believe
it may be more acceptable for a planner to assume scale independence in
time for social preferences rather than for individual preferences.
TSI: For each c > 0, and h = [(ai, ti)i∈N ], h′ = [(a′i, t
′
i)i∈N ],
h % h′ ⇒ [(ai, cti)i∈N ] % [(a′i, ct′i)i∈N ].
A plausible weakening of the previous axiom, time scale independence at
perfect health, says that the notion only applies when restricted to perfect
health. Formally,
TSIPH: For each c > 0, and h = [(a∗, ti)i∈N ], h′ = [(a∗, t′i)i∈N ],
h % h′ ⇒ [(a∗, cti)i∈N ] % [(a∗, ct′i)i∈N ].
The characterizations of the power versions of the QALY and HYE mod-
els come next.9
8Østerdal (2005) considers a counterpart of this axiom in his context.
9One might find natural to restrict both families to those PHEFs corresponding to
γ ≤ 1. It turns out that the following characterization results stated in Theorems 3 and
4 could be enriched to characterize the subsequent families, upon adding a Pigou-Dalton
transfer axiom stating that a health profile in which two agents at perfect health have
different time spans is dominated by the subsequent profile in which those agents keep the
same perfect health status, but share a time span equal to the average of the former two.
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Theorem 3 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (3).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TSI.
Theorem 4 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (4).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and
TSIPH.
It is worth noting that the TSI axiom assumes scale independence for
arbitrary health states while the TICH axiom assumes time invariance for
persons with common health states only. Other than that, the parallelism
between Theorems 2 and 4 mimics the parallelism between Theorems 1 and
3.
4.2 Other generalizations
We conclude with our results by considering two generalized (semi-multiplicative)
PHEFs. The first one generalizes the time component in the linear QALY
model so that it enters into the PHEF in an arbitrary (not necessarily lin-
ear) way. In that sense, it becomes a sort of hybrid between a linear QALY
model and the more general structure of the HYE model.10 Formally,
P qh[h1, ..., hn] = P
qh[(a1, t1), ..., (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
q(ai)w(ti), (5)
where q : A→ [0, 1] is an arbitrary function satisfying 0 ≤ q(ai) ≤ q(a∗) = 1,
for each ai ∈ A, and w : T → [0, 1] is a strictly increasing function satisfying
w(0) = 0.
It turns out that this family is singled out when a new axiom, to be
defined below, is added to our basic structural axioms. First, we need some
prior definitions. A health state a ∈ A is non-degenerate if there exist distri-
butions of life years (ti)i∈N and (t′i)i∈N such that [(a, ti)i∈N ]  [(a, t′i)i∈N ].
For each h = [(ai, ti)i∈N ] ∈ H we say that t is the time egalitarian equivalent
10A similar type of generalization was axiomatized by Miyamoto et al., (1998) for a
model of individual decision making in health.
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if h ∼ [(ai, t)i∈N ].11 The axiom, time egalitarian equivalent invariance for
common health states that time egalitarian equivalents are independent of
non-degenerate health states when all agents share them.
TEICH: For each h = [(a, ti)i∈N ], h′ = [(a′, ti)i∈N ] ∈ H such that a, a′ ∈ A
are non-degenerate, their time egalitarian equivalents coincide.
We can now state the formal result.
Theorem 5 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (5).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TE-
ICH.
The last PHEF we consider is another natural generalization of the linear
QALY PHEF, in which individual QALYs are submitted to an arbitrary (but
increasing) function before being aggregated. Formally,
P gq[h1, . . . , hn] = P
gq[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
g(q(ai)ti), (6)
where q : A→ [0, 1] is an arbitrary function satisfying 0 ≤ q(ai) ≤ q(a∗) = 1,
for each ai ∈ A, and g : R+ → R is a strictly increasing real function.
It turns out that this family is singled out when a new axiom called
time scale independence for common health duplets, is added to our basic
structural axioms described above. The axiom states that if we have two
health profiles with common duplets then the preference between them is
independent of a scaling of the life year component. Formally,
TSICD: For each c > 0, and h = [(a, t)i∈N ], h′ = [(a′, t′)i∈N ] ∈ H,
h % h′ ⇒ [(a, ct)i∈N ] % [(a′, ct′)i∈N ].
We now state the formal result.
Theorem 6 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (6).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and
TSICD.
11The idea of egalitarian equivalence is deeply rooted in welfare economics. The reader
is referred to the excellent monograph by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) for a recent
account of the many applications that have been made of this idea in related contexts.
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5 Discussion
We have presented in this paper a new axiomatic approach to the evalua-
tion of population health. Contrary to most of the previous axiomatic work
within the field, we have considered a model in which no considerations
about individual preferences over health have been made. In doing so, we
bypass a recurrent criticism regarding the difficulty of assessing individual
preferences over health profiles (e.g., Dolan, 2000).12 We have shown that a
framework in which information on individual preferences over health is not
available (either for practical or ethical reasons) still allows to make sound
decisions over the evaluation of population health.13 Somewhat related,
even though we assume (as customary) that individual health is determined
by two dimensions (quality and quantity) we do not presume that individ-
uals evaluate them in a specific given way. In other words, as opposed to
earlier axiomatic contributions on the evaluation of health profiles, we do
not assume that the health of an individual is summarized by a number
(to be interpreted as the number of QALYs, life years, or “health utility”
experienced by a person), but by a duplet referring to the two dimensions.
We have characterized two focal representations of social preferences over
population health distributions; namely, the linear QALY and HYE repre-
sentations. They translate into our context two of the most well-known
and employed techniques to measure the benefits of health interventions in
cost-utility analyses. Those techniques were initially considered as polars,
although some of their differences and similar aspects were addressed (e.g.,
Mehrez and Gafni, 1989; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; Gafni et al., 1993; Ble-
ichrodt, 1995). We have seen in this paper that they share a solid common
ground. To wit, their characterizations share many axioms (anonymity, sep-
arability, continuity, perfect health superiority, time monotonicity at perfect
health, non-desirable death, and the social zero condition) and differ only in
one (the linear QALY requires time invariance at common health, whereas
the linear HYE only requires time invariance at perfect health).
It is worth mentioning that our aim has been to derive specific represen-
tations of social preferences over population health distributions as a result
12Furthermore, it has been recently argued in the so-called Global Burden of Diseases,
Injuries, and Risk Factors Study that person trade-off (rather than individual preference)
information should provide the basis for making priorities.
13An alternative, albeit related, framework has been recently proposed by Fleurbaey and
Shokkaert (2009), who include a concern for respecting individual preferences by means
of a Pareto principle. Such Pareto principle implies that society is indifferent between a
status quo and an hypothetical situation in which “healthy equivalent consumptions” are
considered. This is reminiscent to our treatment of HYEs.
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of combining several ethical and operational axioms. We believe our axioms
are compelling from a normative viewpoint (although, obviously, some to
a higher extent than others). The positive appeal of our axioms has not
been tested in this paper. Nevertheless, there exists a wide variety of exper-
imental contributions testing empirically some of the principles (or related
ideas) over which our axioms rely in related contexts (e.g., Spencer, 2003;
Doctor et al., 2004; Spencer and Robinson, 2007; Turpcu et al., 2011). The
test of the precise axioms we use in our specific context is left for further
research.14
As mentioned above, our axiomatic characterizations permit to scruti-
nize the virtues and shortcomings of the PHEFs we single out by means
of comparing the principles (axioms) that drive each of them. In partic-
ular, we have seen that the linear QALY model relies on the principle of
time invariance at common health, whose normative appeal is mostly re-
stricted to a framework in which the populations being evaluated reflect a
cohort of agents with the same age. This indicates that such a framework
should be the appropriate one to perform standard QALY-based evaluations
of population health, which connects to an old concern in health economics
(e.g., Weinstein, 1988). A similar caveat could be made for the linear HYE
model, which relies on the weaker (albeit intimately related) axiom of time
invariance at perfect health.
We believe that the main relevance of our contribution lies in the lack
of mathematical structure we consider for the set of available health states.
This opens up future possible extensions of our work linking it to other popu-
lar lines of research nowadays, such as the measurement of multidimensional
income inequality, poverty or welfare, or the evaluation of population health
in a context in which health states worse than dead are allowed.
To conclude, it is also worth commenting on another important aspect
of our model. We have not dealt with uncertainty in our analysis.15 More
precisely, we have considered a formulation of the population health evalu-
ation problem which contains no explicit element of risk, and in which we
obtain characterizations of population health evaluation functions without
assumptions on the social planner’s (or individuals’) risk attitudes. Rather
than a limitation, we see this aspect of our analysis as an advantage, as it al-
14We, nevertheless, would remain cautious about the eventual results of such a venture.
As Amos Tversky, one of the leading scholars in the positive approach to decision theory
put it, “give me an axiom and I will design a questionnaire so that the majority of the
people will reject it” (e.g., Gilboa, 2009).
15Broome (1993) argues that uncertainty is a complication rather than an essential part
of the problem of valuing lives, and it ought not to be introduced into the analysis.
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lows us to escape from the usual critiques of the expected utility theory that
are normally considered in the health economics literature (e.g., Bleichrodt
et al., 2001).
6 Appendix. Proofs
Before proving our theorems, we start with two preliminary results. The first
one says that our basic structural axioms imply the following property of
healthy years equivalence, which says that any population health distribution
has a socially equivalent one in which the health outcome of one (and only
one) agent is replaced by that of full health, for some quantity of time.16
Formally,
HYE: For each h ∈ H and i ∈ N there exists t∗i such that h ∼ [hN\{i}, (a∗, t∗i )].
Note that the HYE axiom only postulates that, for each agent and health
profile, a “healthy years equivalent” exists, but not how it should be deter-
mined as a function of the health profile.
Lemma 1 If % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, and
ZERO, then it also satisfies HY E.
Proof. Let i ∈ N and h = [hN\{i}, (ai, ti)] ∈ H. Our aim is to show that
there exists t∗i ≥ 0 such that
h ∼ [hN\{i}, (a∗, t∗i )].
If ti = 0, it follows, by ZERO, that t
∗
i = 0. Otherwise, suppose that
ti > 0, and, by contradiction, that such t
∗
i does not exist. Then, T = A∪B,
where,
A = {s ∈ T |h  [hN\{i}, (a∗, s)]},
and
B = {s ∈ T |[hN\{i}, (a∗, s)]  h}.
By NDD, 0 ∈ A and, thus, A 6= ∅.
Similarly, by PHS and TMPH, ti + ε ∈ B, for some ε > 0, and thus
B 6= ∅.
By CONT, A and B are open sets relative to T .
16This notion can be traced back to Mehrez and Gafni (1989) who propose it as a
plausible way to reflect patient’s preferences over health.
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As A ∩ B = ∅, it would follow that T is not a connected set, a contra-
diction.
Finally, t∗i is well defined and uniquely determined by SEP and TMPH.
Our second preliminary result provides the characterization derived from
combining our basic structural axioms. Formally, separable PHEFs are de-
fined as follows:
P s[h1, . . . , hn] = P
s[(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, ti)) , (7)
where f : A× T → R+ and g : R+ → R are such that:
• f is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈ A× T ,
• h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ], for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, and
• g is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Lemma 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (7).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, and ZERO.
Proof. We focus on the non-trivial implication. Formally, assume% satisfies
ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, and ZERO. By Lemma 1, %
satisfies HYE too. Let h ∈ H. By HYE, for each i ∈ N , there exists t∗i
such that h ∼ [hN\{i}, (a∗, t∗i )]. By SEP, t∗i only depends on (ai, ti) (and,
thus, is independent of the remaining duplets of the profile). Thus, for each
i = 1, . . . , n, let fi : A× T → R be defined such that fi(ai, ti) = t∗i , for each
(ai, ti) ∈ A× T . By ANON, fi(·, ·) ≡ fj(·, ·) ≡ f(·, ·), for each i, j ∈ N . By
TMPH and PHS, 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈ A×T and, by CONT,
f is a continuous function with respect to its second variable. Furthermore,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ],
which implicitly says that social preferences only depend on the profile of
healthy years equivalents, and, by CONT, they do so continuously. It also
follows that the range of f is a connected subset of R. By Theorem 3 in
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Debreu (1960), there exists a strictly increasing and continuous function
g : R+ → R such that
h % h′ ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, ti)) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
f(a′i, t
′
i)
)
,
which concludes the proof.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2 → 1. Formally, assume %
satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TICH. Then,
by Lemma 2, there exists f : A× T → R+ and g : R+ → R are such that:
• f is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈ A× T , and
• g is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Furthermore, for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ],
and, for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, and h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈
H,
h % h′ ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, ti)) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
f(a′i, t
′
i)
)
.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that g(f(aˆ, 0)) = 0 for some aˆ ∈ A.
Let a¯ ∈ A be an arbitrary health state. Then, by iterated application of
TICH, and the transitivity of %,
n∑
i=1
g (f(a¯, ti)) = g
(
f
(
a¯,
n∑
i=1
ti
))
+ (n− 1)g (f(a¯, 0)) .
By ZERO, g (f(a¯, 0)) = g (f(aˆ, 0)) = 0. Thus,
n∑
i=1
g (f(a¯, ti)) = g
(
f
(
a¯,
n∑
i=1
ti
))
.
It then follows that g (f(a¯, ·)) satisfies
g(f(a¯, t1 + t2)) = g(f(a¯, t1)) + g(f(a¯, t2)) (8)
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for any t1, t2 ∈ T , which is precisely one of Cauchy’s canonical functional
equations. As g(f(a¯, ·)) is a continuous function, it follows that the unique
solutions to such equation are the linear functions (e.g., Aczel, 2006; page
34). More precisely, there exists a function qˆ : A→ R such that
g(f(a¯, t)) = qˆ(a¯)t,
for each a¯ ∈ A, and t ∈ T . By PHS and TMPH, it follows that 0 ≤ qˆ(a∗)
and qˆ(ai) ≤ qˆ(a∗), for each ai ∈ A. We now show that qˆ(ai) ≥ 0, for each
ai ∈ A. To do so, let ai ∈ A. By Lemma 1, there exists ti ∈ T such
that qˆ(ai) = g(f(ai, 1)) = g(f(a∗, ti)). By TMPH and ZERO, g(f(a∗, ti)) ≥
g(f(a∗, 0)) = g(f(aˆ, 0)) = 0. Altogether, it says that qˆ(ai) ≥ 0. To conclude,
let q : A → R be such that q(a) = qˆ(a)qˆ(a∗) , for each a ∈ A. Then, it follows
from the above that 0 ≤ q(ai) ≤ q(a∗) = 1, for each ai ∈ A. Thus, % is
represented by a PHEF satisfying (1), as desired.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2 → 1. Formally, assume %
satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TIPH. Then,
by Lemma 2, there exists f : A × T → R+ continuous with respect to its
second variable, and satisfying that 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈
A× T , such that, for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ].
Let h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, and h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈ H.
Then, by iterated application of TIPH, and the transitivity of %,
h % h′ ⇐⇒ [(a∗,
∑
i∈N
f(ai, ti)), (a∗, 0)k∈N\{i}] % [(a∗,
∑
i∈N
f(a′i, t
′
i)), (a∗, 0)k∈N\{i}].
By PHS, and the transitivity of %,
h % h′ ⇐⇒
∑
i∈N
f(ai, ti) ≥
∑
i∈N
f(a′i, t
′
i),
as desired.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2 → 1. Formally, assume %
satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TSI. Then, by
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Lemma 2, there exists f : A×T → R+ continuous with respect to its second
variable, and satisfying that 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈ A×T , such
that, for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ].
Step 1. We claim that for each (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ A× T , and c > 0,
f(a, t) ≥ f(a′, t′) ⇐⇒ f(a, ct) ≥ f(a′, ct′).
Indeed, let h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H and c > 0. Denote hc = [(a1, ct1), . . . , (an, ctn)]
and let (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ A× T . By (7),
[(a, t), hN\{i}] % [(a′, t′), hN\{i}] ⇐⇒ f(a, t) ≥ f(a′, t′),
and
[(a, ct), hcN\{i}] % [(a′, ct′), hcN\{i}] ⇐⇒ f(a, ct) ≥ f(a′, ct′).
By TSI,
[(a, t), hN\{i}] % [(a′, t′), hN\{i}] ⇐⇒ [(a, ct), hcN\{i}] % [(a′, ct′), hcN\{i}].
The transitivity of % concludes.
Step 2. We now claim the following. Let q¯ : A → R be such that
q¯(a) = f(a, 1), for each a ∈ A. Then,
f(a, t) ≥ f(a′, t′) ⇐⇒ q¯(a)t ≥ q¯(a′)t′,
for each (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ A× T .
Indeed, by definition, f(ai, 1) = f(a∗, q¯(ai)). By Step 1,
f(a, t) = f(a′, t′) ⇐⇒ f(a, ct) = f(a′, ct′).
Thus, f(ai, ti) = q¯(ai)ti, as desired.
Step 3. We claim there exists γ > 0 such that, for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈
H, and h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈ H,
h % h′ ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
(q¯(ai)ti)
γ ≥
n∑
i=1
(
q¯(a′i)t
′
i
)γ
.
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Let P denote the PHEF defined by17
P [h1, . . . , hn] = P [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
g (q¯(ai)ti) .
By Step 2, f(·, ·) is a monotonic transformation of the function τ : A×
T → R defined by τ(a, t) = q¯(a)t, for each (a, t) ∈ A × T . Then, by (7), P
represents %. By TSI,
n∑
i=1
g (q¯(ai)ti) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
q¯(a′i)t
′
i
) ⇐⇒ n∑
i=1
g (q¯(ai)cti) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
q¯(a′i)ct
′
i
)
,
for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈ H and
c > 0.
By Bergson and Samuelson (e.g., Burk, 1936; Samuelson, 1965), there
are only three possible functional forms for P :
• P [h1, . . . , hn] = P [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
∑n
i=1 αi (q¯(ai)ti)
γ ,
• P [h1, . . . , hn] = P [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] = −
∑n
i=1 αi (q¯(ai)ti)
δ ,
• P [h1, . . . , hn] = P [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
∑n
i=1 αi log (q¯(ai)ti) ,
for some γ > 0, δ < 0 and sequence {αi} such that αi > 0 for each i ∈ N ,
and for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H such that ti > 0, for each i ∈ N .
It is straightforward to show that the last two functional forms cannot be
continuously extended to the whole domain H, in which zero time spans are
allowed. By ANON, αi = αj for each i, j ∈ N . Finally, let q : A → R be
such that q(a) = q¯(a)γ , for each a ∈ A. Altogether, we have that P = P pq,
as desired.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2 → 1. Formally, assume %
satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TSI. Then,
by Lemma 2, there exists f : A× T → R+ and g : R+ → R are such that:
• f is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈ A× T , and
17The proof of this step follows closely the argument of the proof of Theorem 8 in
Østerdal (2005).
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• g is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Furthermore, for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ],
and, for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, and h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈
H,
h % h′ ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, ti)) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
f(a′i, t
′
i)
)
.
By TSIPH,
n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, ti)) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
f(a′i, t
′
i)
) ⇐⇒ n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, cti)) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
f(a′i, ct
′
i)
)
,
for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈ H and
c > 0.
Let P be a PHEF representing %. As in the proof of Theorem 3, by
Bergson and Samuelson, ANON, and the requirement that P represent %
in the whole domain H, it follows that
P [h1, . . . , hn] = P [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] =
n∑
i=1
(f(ai, ti))
γ ,
for some γ > 0, and for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, which concludes
the proof.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 5
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2 → 1. Formally, assume
% satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TEICH.
Then, by Lemma 2, there exists f : A×T → R+ continuous with respect to
its second variable, and satisfying that 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈
A× T , such that, for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ].
Let w : T → R+ be such that w(t) = f(a∗, t), for each t ∈ T .18 By
ZERO, w(0) = 0. Let a be an arbitrary non-degenerate health state and
18Part of the ensuing proof parallels an argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1 in
Miyamoto et al., (1998).
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consider the resulting health profile h ∈ H in which a fraction p of the
population enjoys a for a period t1 whereas the rest enjoy it for a period
t2 6= t1. Let t∗(t1, t2) be the time egalitarian equivalent. By (7), pf(a, t1) +
(n − p)f(a, t2) = nf(a, t∗(t1, t2)), and, thus, pnf(a, t1) + (1 − pn)f(a, t2) =
f(a, t∗(t1, t2)). By TEICH we have pnw(t1) + (1 − pn)w(t2) = w(t∗(t1, t2)).
As this holds for any t1, t2 ≥ 0, t1 6= t2, the function f(a, t), for fixed a, is an
affine transformation of each w(t). Hence, there are functions A : A→ R+,
B : A→ R+, such that
f(a, t) = A(a)w(t) +B(a).
By ZERO we get B(a) = 0 for each a ∈ A. By HYE, A(a) > 0 for each
non-degenerate state a ∈ A. Then, define the function q : A → R+ by
q(a) = A(a) for each non-degenerate state a ∈ A and q(a) = 0 otherwise.
As a result, f(a, t) = q(a)w(t). By TMPH, w is strictly increasing. By
HYE, q(a) ≥ 0 for each a ∈ A. Finally, by TMPH, and the fact that
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ], we obtain that q(a) ≤ q(a∗) = 1, for each a ∈ A,
which concludes the proof.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 6
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2 → 1. Formally, assume %
satisfies ANON, SEP, CONT, PHS, TMPH, NDD, ZERO and TSICD. Then,
by Lemma 2, there exists f : A× T → R+ and g : R+ → R are such that:
• f is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ f(ai, ti) ≤ ti, for each (ai, ti) ∈ A× T , and
• g is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Furthermore, for each h = [h1, . . . , hn] = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H,
h ∼ [(a∗, f(ai, ti))i∈N ],
and, for each h = [(a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)] ∈ H, and h′ = [(a′1, t′1), . . . , (a′n, t′n)] ∈
H,
h % h′ ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
g (f(ai, ti)) ≥
n∑
i=1
g
(
f(a′i, t
′
i)
)
.
Step 1. We claim that for each (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ A× T , and c > 0,
f(a, t) ≥ f(a′, t′) ⇐⇒ f(a, ct) ≥ f(a′, ct′).
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Indeed, let h = [(a, t), . . . , (a, t)], h′ = [(a′, t′), . . . , (a′, t′)] ∈ H and c > 0.
Denote hc = [(a, ct), . . . , (a, ct)] and h
′
c = [(a
′, ct′), . . . , (a′, ct′)]. By (7),
h % h′ ⇐⇒ f(a, t) ≥ f(a′, t′),
and
hc % h′c ⇐⇒ f(a, ct) ≥ f(a′, ct′).
By TSICD, the claim follows.
Step 2. Let q¯ : A→ R be such that q¯(a) = f(a, 1), for each a ∈ A. We
claim that
f(a, t) ≥ f(a′, t′) ⇐⇒ q¯(a)t ≥ q¯(a′)t′,
for each (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ A× T .
The proof is similar to that of Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 3.
By Step 2, f(·, ·) is a monotonic transformation of the function τ : A×
T → R defined by τ(a, t) = q¯(a)t, for each (a, t) ∈ A × T . Then, by the
above, P gq represents %, as desired.
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